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ABSTRACT 
Investors flock to 5-star mutual funds hoping they’re betting on a winner. Be it sports or 
investments, people believe in a hot hand. In the feature film “The Big Short,” economist 
Richard Thaler compares speculating in financial markets to making side bets on a game of 
blackjack. Can studying a card game tell us something about the nature of mutual fund returns? 
Wins and losses from card games produce a statistically significant positive serial correlation in 
a sequential set of 469 card games (4000+ hands) between two evenly matched players. The 
result reverses the “hot hand fallacy” reported by Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985). Short 
bursts of streaks and slumps are frequent and somewhat predictable, but in the long run results 
regress to a mean. There are implications for investor education and the marketing practices of 
mutual fund companies. 
1. Introduction 
Marketing influences mutual fund sales for better or worse. Investment firms exuberantly 
promote their mutual funds touting 4-star and 5-star Morningstar ratings. The marketing is 
effective. Over a 12-month period, investors put almost $190 billion into 5-star funds while 
pulling out over $240 billion from 2-star and 3-star funds (Waggoner, 2017). Investment firms 
with top-rated funds make Morningstar ratings a part of an investor’s decision process. But 
does this practice make consumers better off? A critical Wall Street Journal article (Grind, 
McGinty, and Krouse, 2017, henceforth GMK) says, no! Consumers don’t buy mutual funds to 
speculate, they want long-term stability and growth. Unfortunately, as GMK points out, after 
three years what was once a 5-star fund performs no better than a typical 3-star fund. What 
does this mean in average returns? The annualized S&P return from 1997 to 2016 was 7.68%. 
Over the same period, the mutual fund investor’s return was only 4.79% (Roberts, 2017). GMK 
warns, “Funds that earned high star ratings attracted the vast majority of investor dollars. Most 
of them failed to perform.”  
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Morningstar ratings allow consumers to pick top-rated funds like they are selecting a hotel or 
buying something on Amazon. People tend to buy funds that have been successful in the past, 
believing the funds will be successful in the future (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber et al., 2005). 
When a mutual fund is on a winning streak, people believe it will continue to win. People have a 
persistent belief in the hot hand. It is possible that investment firms may be encouraging 
behavior that benefits the firm more than the consumer. Investors want to “beat the market” 
and advertising infers they may be able to. Advertising may foster beliefs that consumers can 
“be in control”, “achieve financial goals”, “secure their retirement,” and have all the relevant 
investment tools and market information at their fingertips. 
Who can blame consumers for relying on star ratings and slick charts mapping each fund’s past 
performance and prospects for the future? The market is flooded with mutual fund products. 
Morningstar rates 10,000+ funds sorted into 100+ categories. The top performing 10% of funds 
are awarded 5 stars. Are there really 1000+ mutual funds that will generate above average 
returns now and for many years into the future? Morningstar cautions investors that “Past 
performance does not guarantee future success”, but also defends its star ratings saying, 
“Picking higher rated funds leads to better future results” (Phillips, 2017). Can star ratings that 
categorize the goodness/badness of past returns predict future outcomes? Morningstar thinks 
so. Morningstar claims their star ratings are moderately predictive. GMK reports that after ten 
years, only 14% of 5-star funds remained in the top 10%. Morningstar points out that this 
cohort of 5-star funds beat the odds (Phillips, 2017). 
Is marketing contributing to unrealistic optimism? Can consumers “be in control”, “achieve 
financial goals”, and “secure their retirement” by investing in top-rated funds? This is a 
controversial question. Academics say mutual funds often underperform the market and fund 
managers that are successful do so mostly out of luck (Fama and French, 2010). Forty-five years 
of studying the financial markets has lead Princeton finance professor Burton Malkiel to say, “A 
blindfolded monkey throwing darts at a newspaper’s financial pages could select a portfolio 
that would do just as well as one carefully selected by experts“ (Malkiel, 2019). Wall Street 
investors don’t agree with the academics and naysaying academic papers are perhaps too dry 
or technical for main street investors to take much notice. 
In the 2015 feature film, “The Big Short”, Nobel Prize winner Richard Thaler compares Wall 
Street investing to a game of blackjack. He explains, in a way that everyone can understand, 
how the stock market lost $8 trillion in value when the housing bubble burst in 2007. It is a 
simple message. Don’t trust the hot hand. Even experts on a hot streak with favorable odds can 
run out of luck. When that happens, investors betting on the experts can lose big. With a nod to 
Richard Thaler, let’s find out what a card game can tell us about mutual funds. A card game 
combines skill and luck, and like investing, gives experience and ability a clear advantage. When 
investing in top-rated funds, consumers are betting a hot streak will continue long into the 
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future. Consumers may disregard warnings about the hazards of predicting future performance. 
It goes against consumer logic to invest in a 3-star fund rather than a 4-star or 5-star fund. What 
kind of a consumer would buy a 3-star product on Amazon when a similar, competitively priced 
5-star product is available? 
1.1 Ride winners and cut losers 
Consumers shift billions of dollars to winners from losers based on Morningstar ratings. 
Dalbar’s 2017 QAIB estimates that investors hold funds, on average, less than four years. 
People, in general, suffer from a cognitive illusion. They believe a random sequence of hits and 
misses should look more balanced than they usually do and consequently see a positive 
correlation between successive outcomes when none exist (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
People believe in a hot hand. Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985, henceforth GVT) use data 
from shooting basketballs to prove the point. Fans and players believe shooters making one or 
two shots are more likely to make their next shot compared to shooters missing their last one 
or two shots. But taken as a whole, streaks and slumps in a player’s shooting record do not 
have a positive serial correlation. GVT show that a shooter’s hits/misses are like random flips of 
a fair coin. The current outcome has no influence on any future outcome. People trip 
themselves up when they believe what happens in the short term will also continue into the 
future.  
A hot hand continues to be an interesting research topic. Although usually focused on sports, 
over thirty studies testing for a hot hand have been published since the landmark GVT study 
with mixed results (Bar-Eli, Avugos, and Raab, 2006). Bocskocsky, Ezekowitz, and Stein (2014) 
provide some support for a hot hand in basketball once they take into consideration the 
difficulty of the shot. The study analyzes 83,000 shot attempts collected with the SportVU 
tracking system during the 2012-2013 National Basketball Association (NBA) season. For 
example, when taking the difficulty of shot into consideration, making three out of four 3-point 
shots is a hot hand, whereas making three out of four layups is not. A study of online gambling 
also provides evidence of a hot hand (Xu and Harvey, 2014). When betting on horse races, 
soccer matches, and dog races, winners are more likely to follow up a bet with another win 
than are losers. Losers are more likely to follow up a bet with another loss than are winners. 
Winning leads to more winning because successful bets are followed up with less risky bets. 
Losing leads to more losing because unsuccessful bets are followed up with riskier bets. 
Successful bettors manage risk by using good judgment. Unsuccessful bettors show poor 
judgment by ignoring risk. One can only presume that successful fund managers follow a 
strategy similar to successful bettors. There are billions of dollars at stake for funds that can 
retain 4-star and 5-star ratings. 
Aside from sports and online gambling, some evidence of a hot hand in mutual fund returns has 
been found by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and Zwirlein and Reddy (2000). If there 
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is a difference between “hot hand” cognitive illusion and “hot hand” genuine phenomenon, 
investors need to know it. Investors search the sky for buy/sell signals as do their financial 
advisors. It’s estimated that 250,000 financial advisors rely on Morningstar data, predictive or 
not. Is there evidence of the hot hand in a card game? Is it persistent enough to suggest a 
successful investment strategy? A card game is a much closer analogy to what happens on Wall 
Street than shooting basketballs. Also, it may be easier to follow what’s going on with mutual 
funds by studying a similar, but simplified situation rather than trying to grasp the complexity of 
the 10,000+ mutual funds available to American consumers. 
1.2 Smart investing or smart marketing 
Sales pitches such as, “If you’d invested in XYZ five years ago, your investment would be worth 
ZYX today,” may make people feel they are missing out on big financial opportunities and 
perhaps encourage overconfidence. The truth is often very different. The trouble is that even 
successful investors may not be as good as they remember. Investors that bought Apple in 2004 
at $1 and then sold off in 2007 when it hit $15 missed the real opportunity. Today Apple trades 
at over $180. For other high profile examples, there is Tesla and Netflix. If you bought Tesla in 
2011 at $25, would you have sold in 2013 at $55? Today it is over $290. If you bought Netflix in 
2007 at $3, would you have sold in 2009 at $9? Today it is over $360.  
Salesmanship may encourage consumer overconfidence and build unrealistic optimism in the 
financial industry’s ability to predict the future and build wealth. The stock market marches 
onward and upward, but unpredictably and in short bursts. In studying trading days from 1963 
though 2004, University of Michigan finance professor Nejat Seyhun found that 96% of market 
gains occurred on just 93 of the 10,000+ trading days (Seyhun, 2005). Every month 200+ mutual 
fund returns will be two or more standard deviations above average. This isn’t always because 
these mutual funds are a sure bet, but because monthly mutual fund returns are normally 
distributed and there are more than 10,000 of them. Morningstar ratings policy guarantees that 
there are 1000+ 5-star funds for consumers to choose from. It is like walking into a Las Vegas 
casino with lights flashing, music ringing, and coins jingling from every direction. It is easy to get 
the impression that everyone is winning. What about hot streaks in a card game? Will there be 
long streaks of wins or short bursts of luck? 
1.3 What’s left over is luck 
Aside from Malkiel’s “blindfolded monkey throwing darts” theory, there is another way to 
interpret the inability of actively managed funds to consistently beat the market. Wall Street 
attracts lots of smart people. Everyone is looking for an edge. When skill is the same, what’s left 
over is luck. Like regression analysis, once all the salient predictors are in the equation all that 
remains is random error.  
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Proponents of Efficient Market Hypothesis (Heakal, 2013) and/or Random Walk Theory (Smith, 
2019) believe that no amount of technical analysis (forecasting from past performance) or 
fundamental analysis (forecasting from health of company) give analysts a meaningful and 
persistent advantage when trying to beat the market. In their opinions, the additional fees 
associated with actively managed funds are not worth the price.  
Mutual fund performance does wander up and down. Performance also regresses to the mean 
over time, as shown by Morningstar data reported by GMK. There is not much agreement as to 
why this happens, particularly between Wall Street professionals and university economists. If 
fund returns act as if they are on a random walk, then investment firms perhaps should 
encourage consumers to buy low cost index funds. Will card game results support professional 
investors or university economists? Will a card game between similarly skilled players, always 
on the look out for a competitive edge, produce results that wander up and down, and then 
ultimately regress to a mean?  
2. Method and data 
This study tests for a hot hand in a card game, cribbage, which rewards experience and smart 
game play. Statistics from online cribbage games show that experienced players dealing the 
first hand in a new game will beat inexperienced players nearly 70% of the time. This study (1) 
finds evidence of a hot hand, (2) demonstrates that scoring the goodness of wins and the 
badness of losses is an important step for identifying a hot hand, and (3) suggests that a hot 
hand is real, but long winning streaks are uncommon. 
2.1 Analysis methods 
The results from hundreds of cribbage games are analyzed for serial correlation using a time 
series of wins and losses as well as game-by-game goodness/badness (G/B) scores. Game 
outcomes are compared with millions of cribbage hands reported by online cribbage players. 
G/B scores are assigned to each game, which penalize the “first dealer advantage”, and reward 
exceptional wins. G/B scores are good approximations of the actual point margin of a win/loss 
(r = 0.87, p < .0001, n = 100). G/B scores are similar to Morningstar ratings, which penalize risk 
and rank according to performance. 
2.2 Data set 
The playing history from December 31, 2017 to January 1, 2019, of the same two cribbage 
opponents, was recorded in a game diary. In total, 469 games were played which adds up to 
more than 4,000 individual hands. Each entry in the game diary records the following 
information: date of play, identity of first dealer, high score of first player, high score of second 
player, zero-point hands of first player, zero-point hands of second player, wins and losses, wins 
greater than 30 points (skunk), and goodness/badness scores for each player. Starting in 
February 2019, the diary also records each player’s win/loss margin in points. The loser of the 
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last game always deals the first hand in the next game (first dealer). The winner of the last 
game always deals the second hand in the next game (first pone). To win two or more 
consecutive games, a player must repeatedly overcome the first dealer advantage.  
Two-player cribbage dates to 17th century England. Using a standard 52-card deck, players 
score points by making combinations of 15, making pairs, and making runs of three or more 
cards. Cribbage is a fast game. The first player to score 121 points wins. Experienced players can 
complete a game in 15 or 20 minutes. It is a game of strategy, tactics, and chance. Winning 
relies on experience, judgment, and understanding the odds of one play versus another. There 
is considerable advantage in being the first dealer over the first pone (about six points) because 
the first dealer also counts the first crib. Online cribbage game statistics show, on average, that 
the first dealer has an 11-percentage point advantage and wins 55.5% of the games whereas 
the second dealer (first pone) wins 44.5% of the games. The first dealer has about a 10% chance 
of winning a game by more than 30 points (skunk). The first pone has only about a 5% chance of 
winning a game by more than 30 points.   
Using results calculated from the win/loss point margin recorded in the game diary, a 0-to-100 
goodness/badness (G/B) score is assigned to each game for both players. To be consistent with 
Morningstar ratings, G/B scores penalize the advantage of the first dealer (equivalent of risk-
adjusting returns) and reward the difficulty of winning a game by more than 30 points 
(equivalent of assigning 5 stars to top 10% of funds in the category). The G/B score for the first 
dealer (1) losing by more than 30 points, (2) losing by less than 30 points, (3) winning by less 
than 30 points, and (4) winning by more than 30 points, is 0, 30, 60, 95, respectively. The G/B 
score for the first pone (1) losing by more than 30 points, (2) losing by less than 30 points, (3) 
winning by less than 30 points, and (4) winning by more than 30 points, is 5, 40, 70, 100, 
respectively. With this scoring system, the average G/B scores for evenly matched players will 
be about 50. 
3. Results and analysis 
3.1 Hot hand serial correlation 
Table 1 lists the serial correlation of consecutive games, lagging the time series by one game. 
When calculated from simple win/loss data, the serial correlation of game outcomes is close to 
zero, negative, and not statistically significant (r = -0.017, p < 0.7138). The results are similar to 
GVT and numerous other studies failing to find a hot hand when using hit/miss data.  
In comparison, G/B scores that penalize advantage and reward exceptional performance are 
more predictive. The serial correlation of G/B scores is small, but positive, and statistically 
significant (r = 0.178, p = 0.0001). Correlations are grouped by quarter to show that the 
predictability of outcomes changes over time as players go through streaks, slumps, and trading 
wins back and forth.  
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April-June .276 .068 




   *Statistically significant ((p = .0001) 
Table 18: Serial Correlation of Consecutive Games 
3.2 Hot Hand Momentum 
Following up wins with more wins is a key element of hot hand tested by GVT. In this study, 
average G/B scores are higher following consecutive wins than when following consecutive 
losses. Table 2 lists average scores following one, two, and three consecutive wins and losses. 
Recalling that 50 is the dividing line between win and loss, the data show it is more likely to win 
after a win than it is to win after a loss.  
Using preliminary results from the 2019 game diary, the winning point margin is 14.6 points 
following a win, while it is only 11.5 points following a loss. Winning players have momentum, 
overcoming the six-point first dealer advantage and, on average, still scoring more points than 
losing players coming out of a slump.   
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2 45.5 23.9 113 2 54.1 22.3 116 .003 
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46.6 22.6 54 3 52.8 21.9 59 .070 
Table 19 Goodness/Badness Score Conditioned on Consecutive Wins and Losses 
3.3 Hot Streaks, Cold Slumps, And Regressing To A Mean 
Table 3 lists month-by-month winning percentages for both players with and without the first 
dealer advantage. The overall winning percentage for both players is higher when dealing the 
first hand, as predicted by online cribbage statistics. Nevertheless, there is considerable month-
to-month variation. For example in June 2018, neither player has any luck coming off a loss. 
They lose more than two-thirds of their games although they have the first dealer advantage. In 
May 2018, the opposite is true. Players are having trouble following up one win with another. 
Then there is July 2018, when Player One is winning a disproportionate share of all games. That 
being said, performance regresses to the mean. Out of 469 games, one player won 234 times 
while the other won 235 times.  
A long run of streaks or slumps is very much out of the ordinary. Only once in an entire year of 
game play, did one player win twelve games in a row and the other player win thirteen games 
in a row. Wins and losses occur in short bursts and look a lot like chance until one considers 
that a player with a streak of consecutive wins starts each game at a substantial disadvantage. 
In these data, the loser always deals the first hand of the next game putting the recent winner 
at a six-point disadvantage. Six points is a lot in a game where one or two points can often 
make the difference between winning and losing.  
A long winning streak gains a lot of attention when it happens. Joe DiMaggio had at least one 
base hit in 56 straight games. Oral Hershiser pitched 59 consecutive scoreless innings. Kobe 
Bryant played ten consecutive games scoring 30 or more points. Byron Nelson won 11 straight 
golf tournaments. These are rare events, but because of their notoriety people may think long 
winning streaks occur much more frequently than they really do. 
In these data, there are many short bursts of three, four, or five consecutive wins. Short bursts 
of winning streaks are frequent enough to make them at least somewhat predictable. Players 
gain and lose momentum. There is a positive and statistically significant serial correlation in the 
data. Good outcomes are followed up by other good outcomes with a regularity that rules out 
chance error. A winner following up one or more wins scores more points than a winner 
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February .444 .563 .438 .556 
March .667 .684 .316 .333 
April .454 .462 .539 .546 
May .706 .632 .368 .294 
June .333 .240 .760 .667 
July .579 .440 .560 .421 
August .474 .529 .471 .526 
September .529 .474 .526 .471 
October .458 .458 .542 .542 
November .500 .619 .381 .500 
December 
 
.417 .500 .500 .583 
Overall .511 .509 .491 .489 
  *About 40 games are played each month 
Table 3: Probability of Winning Conditioned on Dealing the First Hand 
4. Discussion 
Interpreting hit/miss data may not be as straightforward as it may seem. Miller and Sanjurjo 
(2018) identify a “streak selection bias” in past hot hand studies. Simply stated, when 
considering short runs of hits/misses, the probability of a hit being followed up with another hit 
is much less than 50% even when making tosses with a fair coin. When correcting for the bias, 
Miller and Sanjurjo reverse the findings of GVT and its replicates. They conclude the previous 
studies, when analyzed correctly, provide strong evidence that “it is not a fallacy to believe in 
the hot hand.” 
Simple wins and losses ignore advantage/disadvantage of starting position and 
strength/weakness of performance. They are uncorrelated. Assigning goodness/badness scores 
to these same wins and losses produces a positive, statistically significant correlation. This 
finding may say something about the predictability of mutual fund performance. The 
penalty/reward style of Morningstar ratings either spotlights a hot hand or creates an illusion of 
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a hot hand. It calls attention to something that shouldn’t be missed or adds something that isn’t 
there. The least one can say is that Morningstar ratings effectively filter out the poorest mutual 
funds awarding them only 1 or 2 stars. 
The legacy of GVT is to show that people frequently see patterns in randomness, and this 
cognitive illusion makes for bad decisions. This is true whether a person believes a hot streak 
won’t end (hot hand fallacy) or a slump won’t continue (gambler’s fallacy). But human nature 
being what it is, wouldn’t we all like to have better information when deciding if a pattern is 
real and whether it will continue? Investing is a type of game in which smart choices and 
discipline are supposed to pay off. It is unsatisfying to attribute exceptional success to the flip of 
a coin. 
When it comes to picking investments, consumers are stuck between the proverbial “a rock and 
a hard place”. Don’t bet on the hot hand. Don’t sell a winner too soon. Don’t hold a loser too 
long. Don’t wait too long before getting back into a growing market. To sum it up, consumers 
are given a lot of confusing advice, and then told to “do the opposite of what feels comfortable 
to earn higher returns” (Egan, 2018).  
Dalbar’s 2015 Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) describes the situation, 
“Improvements through investor education have only produced marginal benefits. After 
enormous efforts by thousands of industry experts to educate millions of investors, imprudent 
action continues to be widespread.” Dalbar’s analysis shows investors chronically sell off good 
investments too soon, and then, once burnt with a loss, wait too long before buying back into 
the market once it heats up. The 2017 QAIB reports that the S&P 500 continues to outperform 
equity mutual fund investors at a margin over and above what can be reasonably expected 
primarily because of “panic selling” and “following the herd”. 
5. Marketing Implications 
It may be possible that mutual fund marketing encourages a consumer’s worst biases. In 
Sweden, company-sponsored advertising, emphasizing past performance (Morningstar 5-star 
ratings) and image (Harrison Ford can give you a better pension), convinced two-thirds of over 
four million eligible consumers to sign up with actively managed private pension funds rather 
than the default government fund. The government fund performed better, was much less 
expensive, and carried less risk than the private funds (Cronqvist and Thaler 2004, Cronqvist 
2004). At least in this example, advertising deemphasized risk and fees. Over the first three 
years of the Swedish plan, the average private pension fund lost about 40% of its value.  
Promising to give consumers what they want obligates marketing to give consumers at least 
what they need. Morningstar believes their star ratings are moderately predictive, but few 5-
star funds produce above average returns for more than two or three years. Consumers hope 
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for more, but they shouldn’t if mutual fund returns behave like a card game. Outcomes of card 
games show that hot hand winning streaks are not easy to predict and don’t last for long. Past 
outcomes are not very predictive when chance plays a big role in determining future outcomes. 
Chance guarantees surprising streaks and devastating slumps. Consumers that ignore “fine 
print” warnings are bound to be surprised when their savings plans take a dive. Star ratings are 
well intentioned, but Morningstar itself admits that expense ratios (the percentage of asset 
deducted each year for fund expenses) are more predictive of future performance than are star 
ratings (Kinnel, 2016). As an example, a 4-star fund that consistently performs a little above the 
median, such as Vanguard’s Total Stock low cost index fund, has proven to be a better long-
term investment than many 5-star funds.  
Many choices won’t necessarily lead to better choices. Even in a simple card game it is difficult to 
distinguish between illusion and the real deal. A hot hand is real, but it comes and goes without 
much warning and doesn’t stay for long. Morningstar rates 10,000+ funds sorted into 100+ 
categories. Product proliferation may hide genuine stars and complicates choices for 
consumers. No doubt there is a golden needle in the haystack, but even investment 
professionals can struggle to find it. All these products and product categories are not the fault 
of Morningstar. It is a common practice of an entire industry that has discovered the miracle of 
compound complexity. Customer-focused marketing strives for better choices not just more 
choices. 
Justifying a high price is easier than earning one. Popular investment strategies such as buy-and-
hold when combined with high cost, actively managed funds all but guarantee poor returns. As 
the number of card games stacks up, each player’s performance regresses to the mean. Each 
player dominates the other for a time, but in the long run both perform about the same. Just 
like a card game, fund performance runs in streaks and slumps and ultimately regresses to the 
mean. In the GMK review, after ten years the average 5-star fund earns 3-stars and the average 
1-star fund earns about 2-stars. Consequently, investing in low cost index funds using strategies 
such as dollar cost averaging (consistent periodic investment) and annual rebalancing (buying 
and selling assets to maintain the original fund allocation) should be considered. 
Zwirlein and Reddy (2000) analyzed risk and returns for three mutual fund strategies. Using data 
from January 1977 through December 1992 a “hot hand” strategy worked best when compared 
to a buy-and-hold strategy, and a low-cost strategy in IRAs, 401(k) plans, and other tax-favored 
investments. With a $600 monthly investment, the hot hand strategy returned $489,023 
compared to $345,838 and $320,335 for buy-and-hold and low-cost, respectively. Rebalanced 
quarterly, the hot hand strategy invested every dollar into the fund performing best in the 
previous month. Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) made a similar observation about the 
short-run persistence of mutual fund returns. 
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Getting workers to invest in a 401(k) is a bigger marketing problem than fighting over which 
fund(s) workers choose. In 2019, for the first time in history there is as much money invested in 
index funds as there is in actively managed funds (Segal, 2019). Only three years ago, actively 
managed funds had over $9 trillion under management whereas index funds had less than $3 
trillion under management. Consumers apparently are responding to the call of low cost index 
funds and walking away from the notion of beating the market.  
Not saving for retirement is a bigger problem than maximizing returns. It takes many years, 
probably decades, to build an adequate retirement fund and Americans are not saving. CNBC 
reports that only about 16% of Americans have saved $200,000 or more towards retirement 
(Martin, 2019). In 2016, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the average retired 
household spends about $3,800 a month. In 2017, the Social Security Administration reported 
that the average monthly benefit is just over $1,400. Personal savings will have to make up the 
gap. One possible way for mutual fund companies to make consumers better off is to consider 
redirecting marketing budgets to support cooperative efforts with employers to make low cost 
401(k) plans available and encourage American workers to start saving. 
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Relevance to Marketing Educators, Researchers, and Practitioners:  
Suggests several ways that mutual fund marketing can become more customer focused rather 
than product focused. Consumers may be beginning to question mutual fund company 
promotion tactics, product proliferation, and pricing practices. Starting in 2107 trillions of 
investment dollars have shifted from branded, high cost actively managed funds to more 
generic, low cost passive index funds. Perhaps of greater importance, marketing is not 
persuading more employers to offer savings plans or more Americans to save. It is estimated 
80% of Americans are underinvested. Only 16% of Americans have saved $200,000 or more 
towards retirement. Comparing mutual fund returns to a card game spotlights the complexity 
of choosing from among 10,000+ funds available to American consumers. Game results, like 
mutual fund returns, run in streaks and slumps, and then ultimately regress to a mean. Even 
with expert play, chance plays a key role in determining outcomes. 
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